Cutting the Gordian Knot: Taiwan and U.S. China Relations by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
1976
Cutting the Gordian Knot: Taiwan and U.S. China
Relations
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation










' . Cutting the Gordian Knot: 
·' 
Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations 
By Senator Mike Mansfield 
United States relations with China today are on a plateau, 
reached more than three years ago with the opening of diplo-
matic liaison offices in Peking and Washington. President 
Ford has repeatedly stated that the United States is determined 
, "to complete the normalization of relations with the People's 
Republic of China on the basis of the Shanghai Communique." 
However, there has been a policy of avoidance. With the 
principal antagonists in the Chinese civil war now gone, it is 
time to wipe the slate clean, to fulfill the promise of the 
Shanghai Communique by completing the process. There is only 
one obstacle to normalization, the Taiwan issue, 
Taiwan is a point of utmost sensitivity in China's new 
national consciousness. It is the last vestige of China's 
humiliation at the hands of outside powers. China's position 
on normalization is unwavering. It expects the United States 
to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, terminate the defense 
treaty, and withdraw all military forces from the island. This 
is the Japanese formula as applied to the American situation. 
Since ~972, .when it severed relations with Taiwan and 
established diplomatic relations with Peking, Japan's trade 







with and investments in Taiwan continue at high levels . 
Japanese affairs relating to the island are looked after by 
a quasi•official office called the Japanese Interchange Assoc-
iation. Taiwan maintains a similar non-diplomatic office in 
Tokyo. Other countries having diplomatic relations with China 
operate in Taiwan under similar arrangements. · so could the 
United States. 
The answer to the Taiwan problem is not to be found i n 
Peking but in Washington. It is a domestic problem for t he 
United States. The fact that must be faced is that the United 
States cannot have it both ways. We cannot strengthen our t i es 
with a claimant government of China on Taiwan and, at the same time, 
expect to advance ·a new relationship with the government of t he 
People's Republic of China. The Shan&hai Communique was des igned 
as a transitional arrangement; it did not predicate an indefinite 
· ambivalence in America's China policy. Equivocation over the 
Taiwan problem has continued fQr too long. Ambivalence has 
created a dangerous situation and further delay could bring 
about serious long-term consequences for American policy i n the 
Pacific area. 
Stagnation is the enemy of a sound, constructive fore ign 
policy, and indecision in policy-making about Taiwan is pushi ng 
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Americans into choosing sides. There is a hint of a resurgence 
of the divisiveness of a quarter century ago that led to the 
current policy dilemma. The internal problems of China in the 
wake of Mao's departure could create conditions in both countries 
where the mutual interests now sustaining the relationship will 
be weakened. Delay may well strengthen the harid of the elements 
in the Chinese leadership seeking to restore greater comity 
with the Soviet Union even at the expense of the U.S. relationship. 
The failure to face up to the Taiwan issue will only make the 
inevitable decision more ·difficult, controversial, and divisive. 
Although it is unrealistic to expect that the Chinese 
government will renounce the use of force to regain control of 
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, Taiwan, the Chinese are not likely to rush the process of 
absorbing Taiwan into the life of the mainland after the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States • 
. As the Chinese see the problem, acceptance of the Erinciple 
at stake and the practical incorporation of Taiwan into China's 
life are two different matters. The Chinese are impatient 
with regard to unequivocal acceptance of the principle, which 
stands in the way of complete normalization of relations. But 
that impatience over principle, however~ is tempered by priorities. 
Concern over the Soviet Union comes first at this time. Inso-
far as Taiwan is concerned, timing does not· appear to be a pressing 
problem. While the process of absorption is regarded as in-· 
evitable it is likely to take many years. 
I believe that satisfactory arrangements can be worked out 
concerning the handling of America's residual relations with Taiwan, 
as has been the case with Japan and other countries. Moreover, 
the Chinese know full well that any unprovoked military action 
in the Western Pacific would be a seriously unsettling event in 
Asia which could set off grave repercussions in the United St ates 
and Japan, to say the least. It would undermine a basic element 
in present Chinese foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. The 
peaceful merging of Taiwan with the mainland, therefore, must 
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be an implicit element in working out diplomatic arrangements 
between the People's Republic and the United States. 
Congressional action may be necessary to arrange for con-
tinuation of trade and related ties to Taiwan to accord with 
a U.S. version of the "Japanese formula". In the spirit of 
bi-partisanship which has marked support of U.S. China policy 
since the Shanghai Communique, Congress should be prepared to 
take such action, as the Senate did in 1971 in approving a 
resolution giving " •••• full support to the President (Nixon) 
in seeking the normalization of relations with the People's 
Republic of China." 
It is important that a dialogue begin without delay between 
the People's Republic and Taiwan. Th~ Shanghai Communique states 
that America's goal is "a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves." Leaders of the People's 
Republic of China have repeatedly expressed their willingness to 
engage in peaceful relations with Taiwan and have made gestures 
to underscore the point. 
For more than two decades the United States closed its 
official mind to China and the channels of effective communi-
cation between the two nations were blocked. The consequences 
of this period of know-nothingism still linger. Miscalculations 





about China may well have been the main factor in the involve-
ment of the United States in two major wars in Asia in a single 
generation. Pressures are at work which could cause another 
major miscalculation over Taiwan. 
America's national interest is deeply involved in moving 
without further delay to settle the Taiwan problem. Further 
delay could well prove to be another in the long series of 
disastrous miscalculations which have afflicted U.S. foreign 
policy in Asia since World War II. Solving this problem will 
put the United States in a unique position in the triangular 
relationship. If it acts more wisely than in the past, the 
United States will act now, not on the basis of emotional catch-
phrases, but on the basis of its long-range interests in the 
Western Pacific. Fundamental to the safeguarding of these 
interests is an open diplomatic door between the government 
of what will soon be a billion Chinese and the government of 
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